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Divergence Within the Region
Russia’s war against Ukraine and the consequences for European security are reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the EU’s eastern neighborhood. These shifts are driving significant changes in regional dynamics and altering relations between the EU and its Eastern Partnership (EaP) neighbors, which are diverging in their EU ambitions. Ukraine and Moldova, now EU candidate countries, are undergoing the EU’s screening process and have the ambition to open negotiations on the first cluster of chapters, “Fundamentals,” very soon. Armenia is also developing closer ties to the EU, deepening security cooperation, and starting negotiations on visa liberalization, as well as launching the country’s accession process to the EU.
Meanwhile, Georgia’s government is consolidating its authoritarian rule and has paused the country’s EU accession process. Azerbaijan is keen on economic cooperation and deepening connectivity, particularly in the energy and infrastructure sectors, but rejects the normative conditions that accompany EU partnerships. These diverging developments mean that the EU must tailor its approach to each country’s specific context. To that end, it should make use of its connectivity policy, which is relevant to all five countries and could also serve to strengthen Europe’s normative approach.
The EU’s Connectivity Policy
The EU’s connectivity policy is defined by the EU’s approach to the relations between Europe and Asia. Originally, it was all “about networks,” meaning links in the transport sector, digital networks, energy and flows as well as ties in the human dimension. As a normative actor with a values-based foreign and neighborhood policy approach, the EU is aiming to create connections and interdependencies within Europe and beyond. According to this approach, investment in infrastructure should be sustainable and reflect respect for the rule of law, human rights, and international norms and standards. In 2021, the EU launched Global Gateway as a ”new European strategy to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world.”
In the EaP countries, the EU’s connectivity projects are supported by plans “to promote growth-enhancing investments, fostering economic resilience and progressive integration both among our Eastern partners and with the EU.” They are part of the Eastern Partnership policy, for instance by linking EaP countries to the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), a planned network of roads, railways, airports, and water infrastructure across Europe, and the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) for interconnecting high voltage electricity networks. As part of the EU’s cooperations agreements, partner countries are granted trade benefits in exchange for their compliance with the Union’s norms and values.
A Contested Region
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has transformed connectivity from a predominantly economic concept to a security imperative. In this new geopolitical reality, infrastructure is increasingly being weaponized, particularly in the Black Sea region. Energy dependencies and digital networks have become instruments to exert influence. As Western countries are using trade as a weapon against Russia, Russia, as a result of Western sanctions, has become ever more dependent on trading via the South Caucasus and the Caspian and Black Seas.
At the same time, the EU’s connectivity policy in the eastern neighborhood and the South Caucasus is coming under increasing competition from other players: Russia controls key energy, railway, and other infrastructure assets particularly in the South Caucasus and is a major trade partner there. China is also present and uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its regional and global influence through infrastructure investments. Turkey, although a regional rather than a global player, is seeking to dominate the Black Sea region and to add to its influence in the South Caucasus.
Given the shifts in global power dynamics, now dominated by security and transactional relations, the EU must adapt if it wants to remain relevant to its Eastern neighborhood and beyond. Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the pace of geopolitical change has accelerated. With the United States scorning multilateral institutions, turning towards transactional policies, and unleashing a global trade war, Europe is emerging as the main proponent of a norms- and rules-based order.
As a result, connectivity is becoming even more important as part of the EU’s foreign and neighborhood policy. The concept of connectivity now intersects with geopolitical competition, security policy, hybrid threats, regional stability, and the protection of strategic infrastructure.
EU Weaknesses
Despite the EU’s ambitious rhetoric, its connectivity projects remain chronically underfunded. The Global Gateway is a dwarf when compared to the scale of China’s BRI. Moreover, funding is fragmented, which greatly lessens the impact of EU projects. And as there are no clear rules to ensure the projects are carried out by the EU or local companies, some EU-funded projects are implemented by Chinese to the local economy.
Unless the EU mobilizes new financial instruments or sets up a dedicated European Connectivity Fund, it will not be able to meet its geopolitical ambitions. At the same time, the EU needs to be much more stringent about ensuring that its connectivity projects comply with European standards and regulations to of the process.
The new European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, has been tasked with developing “a coordinated approach to supporting the countries of the Southern Caucasus, including on regional connectivity, together with the High Representative/Vice-President.” However, these ambitions have yet to be translated into concrete policies, norms, and objectives and backed by new financial instruments.
The absence of a clear strategy also points to a lack of ambition and political consensus among member states. The EU as a whole must agree on defining the scope of its infrastructure investments and tying them to its normative agenda. In this context, connectivity should be seen as a tool to deepen EU alliances with the EaP countries, maintain the EU’s influence, and address competition with other actors.
A more strategic approach to connectivity could enable the EU to engage with Azerbaijan and possibly Georgia. Investment levels should be linked to progress on reforms and human rights while acknowledging that partner countries may not fully share the EU’s values. A “more-for-more, less-for-less” approach could be applied, ensuring that the EU safeguards both its interests and its values. This requires defining differentiated levels of ambition, country-specific priorities, and engagement strategies.
The EU should also expand its connectivity approach to include Turkey and Central Asian countries, given their growing influence and potential as partners. This process has already started, and while further steps might require scaling back political ambitions, the EU would regain influence in a region where Russia and China remain dominant actors. Defining connectivity in both financial and strategic terms would provide greater clarity on how the EU competes with other actors. It would also enable the EU to create stronger East- West connectivity routes and integrate the countries into global trade.
Meanwhile, connectivity projects in Ukraine and Moldova should be continued and scaled up to support both countries’ EU integration.
Balancing Normative Commitments and Pragmatic Needs
The EU must balance its normative commitments (human rights, rule of law, environmental standards, labor rights, democracy) with pragmatic needs (security partnerships, trade, and resource access) to maintain regional influence. The key questions remain: What kind of connectivity does the EU need? Should the EU prioritize economic connectivity over political influence? To which extent should financial support be linked to the values-based approach? Where are the red lines?
The EU’s connectivity offer is different from that of China and Russia due to Europe’s normative agenda and participative approach. As a result, the eligibility criteria for project funding need to be redefined, particularly concerning engagements with authoritarian states and implementing partners to ensure that projects comply with the EU standards. As Russia’s hybrid warfare targets critical infrastructure in the Black Sea and Baltic regions, the EU’s approach must also address the links between connectivity and security. Similar attention should be given to cybersecurity.
At the same time, the EU’s connectivity policy must remain flexible enough to swiftly respond to political shifts, such as Armenia’s deepening of relations with the EU. The EU could, for instance, help Armenia gain access to new markets to diversify its trade. Even if there are limits, the EU’s strategic connectivity initiatives could bridge the increasingly divergent trajectories of EaP countries while fostering closer ties to the EU.
In redefining its connectivity approach, the EU has a choice between three models:
A more transactional and pragmatic connectivity model: The EU would focus on the economic aspects of an investment without imposing strict normative conditions. Such an approach, however, carries the risk of eroding the EU’s values. The EU might end up mimicking China’s approach without being able to financially match the BRI.
A normative connectivity model: EU projects would be conditioned on democratic reforms and human rights. As a result, the EU would have to reduce its engagement with authoritarian regimes such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, which would mean losing influence in these countries.
A hybrid approach: The EU would differentiate its approach. The level of political and economic engagement would depend on each partner country’s commitment to reforms and norms as well as the EU’s strategic interests. While this would allow the EU to remain present and maintain its influence, it must be careful not to legitimize authoritarian regimes.
Recommendations
Despite its ambitions, the EU’s connectivity agenda faces significant resource constraints –particularly given that Europe’s domestic infrastructure is underfunded, too. Lack of funding has hampered initiatives such as the Global Gateway, the Middle Corridor, and the Black Sea connectivity projects. Divergent interests among member states account for a lack of political commitment. As a result, the expectations the EU created with its connectivity agenda remain unfilled.
To address these issues, the EU should:
Engage in a strategic review of its connectivity ambitions in the new geopolitical context, setting clear priorities and defining red lines.
Redefine its engagement with authoritarian states, linking funding to governance and reform benchmarks while acknowledging that full alignment may not be possible.
Differentiate its engagement based on each EaP country’s level of integration with the EU.
Mobilize greater financial resources to match expectations, including through low-interest loans.
Focus on improving security by prioritizing cybersecurity and resilient infrastructure.
Conclusion
The EU should focus on connectivity in its revised Eastern Partnership policy. As security and connectivity are becoming increasingly intertwined, the EU must make sure that its investments serve both its geopolitical interests and its commitment to democratic values and norms. Without a more strategic and better-funded approach, the EU risks losing relevance as a geopolitical actor, particularly in countries not interested in EU accession.
- The Input Papers
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In July 2024, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) organized a colloquium on connectivity and geopolitics in Tbilisi. Nine papers on different aspects of connectivity were presented at the conference, including on economic and infrastructure issues, green hydrogen, the roles of China and the EU, the Middle Corridor, and the EU’s space policies.
This report and its policy recommendations for the EU are based on those nine papers, which frame the topic from different angles, reflecting the wide variety of connectivity approaches.
As geopolitical competition over infrastructure and connectivity is intensifying, the EU needs to address the growing influence of both Russia and China in its eastern neighborhood and the South Caucasus. The papers show China’s growing influence in Georgia (through projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative) and in Central Asia (via supply chains for critical raw materials).
At the same time, Russia continues to act as a disruptor, exerting pressure through its leverage over energy supplies. Several papers focus on reducing reliance on Russian energy, covering topics such as Moldova’s heating sector, biogas in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region, and hydrogen development in Ukraine, as well as infrastructure and trade routes in Armenia.
Transport corridors, according to several papers, play a strategic role in this geopolitical competition. The North-South Corridor with its Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran route is strengthening Russia’s position. Meanwhile, the initiatives like the Black Sea Submarine Electricity Cable (BSSEC )and the Trans-Caspian Corridor highlight the EU’s efforts to bypass Russia and develop alternative supply routes for goods and energy. While the CEHC (Hydrogen Corridor) and Ukraine’s hydrogen sector have potential as future suppliers for Germany and the EU, developing them would also require significant investment.
Technology and digital sovereignty are at the focus of yet another paper. It examines whether the EU’s IRIS satellite project has the potential to reduce dependence on foreign satellite networks (such as Starlink and China’s systems). It also highlights cybersecurity concerns, as seen in Russia’s hacking of Ukraine’s networks, which exposed vulnerabilities in the digital infrastructure of both the EU and its partner countries.
The papers assess the EU’s role in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries and the South Caucasus. The key takeaway is that geopolitical developments are directly shaping the EU’s connectivity agenda and infrastructure ambitions in the region. While opportunities for EU engagement exist, the substantial investment required by those projects is often underestimated. The EU also needs to be careful to not indirectly support Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as has happened in Georgia.
At the workshop, the following conclusions were reached:
The EU must adapt to the new geopolitical reality dominated by transactional and security-driven policies without losing its normative identity. This is a dilemma which the EU finds particularly difficult to overcome as it was not designed as a security actor. But if the EU fails to take security sufficiently into account, it could lose its relevance in in its eastern neighborhood and the South Caucasus – regions where China and Russia are highly active.Connectivity can be a strategic tool for addressing both regional divergence and external challenges, but it requires robust safeguarding mechanisms, financial backing, and high-level policy alignment among EU member states.
The Black Sea and energy networks are pivotal to the EU’s connectivity ambitions, presenting both opportunities and risks. While there is no consensus on the way forward, particularly due to differing opinions on Turkey’s engagement, it is clear that the EU must redefine its priorities. That means making choices between the projects it will invest in and the project that do not enjoy the same priority.
The EU must align its connectivity initiatives, including the Global Gateway, with its broader regional strategy and its geopolitical objectives, ensuring a security-conscious, values-driven approach.
Disclaimer: Please be aware that the subsequent input papers were published as submitted by the authors, without any editorial modifications.
