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The increasingly pronounced pro-Russian orientation of successive Orbán governments since 2010 is a result of ideological as well as pragmatic economic considerations, creating a considerable path dependency and limiting Viktor Orbán’s room for manoeuvre. As a result, the Hungarian government envisions Russia becoming an integral part of a new European security system – though Budapest has never clarified the institutional details of how this would work in practice – while Ukraine remains outside of it as a buffer zone. However, the upcoming April 2026 parliamentary elections could change all of this. Should Orbán remain in power, his firmly Russia friendly and anti-Ukrainian foreign policy will certainly continue, alongside the growing isolation of Hungary within the European Union (EU).
In this case, Hungary will increasingly become an outlier in any emerging European security order by pushing for the inclusion of Moscow, continuing to represent Moscow’s interests, and hampering Ukraine’s EuroAtlantic integration. However, should the opposition win, a fundamental change is likely to emerge in Hungary’s foreign policy, and Budapest will begin realigning policy vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine with that of the EU. Hence, this chapter examines the foreign policy approaches of the ruling party as well as the opposition force, TISZA (Respect and Freedom Party), describing two alternative visions in Hungary regarding Russia and Ukraine.
A possible turning point in Hungary’s authoritarian trajectory Orbán has had successive terms as prime minister of Hungary since 2010, and during most of this period he has ruled with a constitutional supermajority. The transformation of Hungary’s domestic political system into a consolidated autocracy in this interval is well documented. The gradual, increasingly authoritarian transformation of the Hungarian political system since 2010 in many regards has closely followed patterns seen earlier in Russia. Similar to Vladimir Putin, from 2010 onwards successive Orbán governments centralised much of the Hungarian media space, took over formally independent oversight bodies, and subdued most of the country’s oligarchs. Russia was held up as a model shortly after Orbán’s re-election in April 2014.
In his speech delivered at Băile Tușnad in the summer of 2014,3 Orbán proclaimed his will to build an “illiberal democracy” and named Russia, China, Turkey, and a number of other countries as models of non-Western, non-liberal political systems, yet still successful states. Although the speech did not indicate a geopolitical reorientation towards Moscow – as Orbán only endorsed Russia’s non-liberal way of ruling – the message was still radically different from those of other member states of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 11 years that have passed since, Orbán has referred several times to Russia as a successful, stable, and desirable political model. This appreciation of Russia manifests also in the frequent personal meetings between Orbán and Putin.
