Partnership Short of Alliance: Military Cooperation Between Russia and China

Dr. András Rácz

Dr. Alina Hrytsenko

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands as they pose for photos before a meeting in May 2025 — License

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The growing military-technical partnership between Russia and China has become an increasingly influential factor in shaping global security dynamics, particularly in the context of Russia’s ongoing full-scale war against Ukraine. Since February 2022, China has gradually become one of the key enablers of sustaining Russia’s war effort, particularly when it comes to the defense industry. However, to understand this change, it is necessary to study the earlier periods of military relations between Beijing and Moscow, because many elements of their contemporary cooperation were built on foundations laid down well before 2022.

This comprehensive report, published by Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in June 2025 here, assesses the depth and dynamics of Russian-Sino military cooperation, by comparing the era that preceded the breakout of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 to the 2014-2022 period and to the one that followed the full-scale escalation. The “fog of war” means there is very limited reliable information about the details of contemporary military-technological cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. This particularly concerns details about ongoing weapons and arms component transfers. Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions about the general trends of military cooperation between the two countries, especially given the absence of certain actions and commitments, which are indicative of the limits of their military cooperation.

Executive Summary:

Before 2014, military cooperation between Russia and China was characterized by pragmatic, practical considerations: Russia contributed to the modernization of China’s armed forces by selling various types of weaponry, while Beijing was a lucrative market for Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia has lost access both to Ukraine’s defense industry and to its Western military-industrial partners. This has left Russia with China as the sole remaining major source of much-needed imported military technology and components. In exchange, China has received access to advanced Russian missile, air defense, and electronic warfare technology. Deepening cooperation has also been demonstrated by the growing frequency of joint military exercises. As of early 2025, Beijing was a crucial, irreplaceable enabler of Russia’s sustained war efforts against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, despite declarations about a “no-limits” partnership, the cooperation is indeed limited. While Russia and China share a strong anti-US stance, Beijing is unwilling to limit its own strategic autonomy and freedom of maneuver by making any commitment to Russia that would lead to an open conflict with the West or the introduction of sanctions.
A prime example of the limits

Web links

Read the full report published by CEPA here

About the Authors

Alina Hrytsenko, PhD, is a political scientist and analyst specializing in international relations and security. She previously worked at the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine and currently serves as a visiting lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Andras Racz, PhD, is Senior Fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin and is Associate Professor at the Budapest Corvinus University. He previously worked at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and was a visiting researcher of the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.