First published on July 16, 2025, as part of the CIRS Policy Brief “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Assessments, Implications, Prospects” (Georgetown University in Qatar). Access the full publication here.
The war has undermined Russia’s role as the regional hegemon in its post-Soviet neighborhood and its global positioning. One reaction was a NATO northern enlargement, with Finland and Sweden joining the alliance. While Russia brought war back to Europe, the West reacted by instituting increased substantial economic sanctions on Russia and increasing financial support and weapons supply to Ukraine. In a very short period of time, Europe—the most important market for Russian oil and gas companies over the past few decades—decoupled from Russian oil and gas supplies.
The End of Russian Hegemony
Russia’s threat perception in its “traditional sphere of influence” has changed fundamentally for nearly all post-Soviet countries, especially direct neighbors. Russia’s limited economic resources, with a GDP similar to Spain, and its focus on Ukraine, has meant that it is increasingly challenged by third powers like Turkey, China, Iran, and Arab countries—as observed in Syria with the fall of Assad. Even Russia’s smaller neighbors, like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, have improved their bargaining position towards Moscow. The EU opened its accession package as a reaction to Russia’s war on Ukraine and no longer shows considerations for Russia’s interest in the common neighborhood. In regard to their relationships with Moscow, there is a new dynamic in the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, which are increasingly improving their bargaining position.
Ukraine is key to all these developments since it is the main driver for the future European security order and EU enlargement policy. The outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine can also set a precedent for global security with regard to the roles of the US and NATO. Many countries in the world, including China, closely follow the US’s reaction to Russian aggression. No matter how this war will end, it has changed the security and geopolitical balance in Eurasia. In destroying the European security order and focusing its resources on the war in Ukraine, Russia can no longer guarantee authoritarian stability in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. Moscow must now bargain with and make compromises to the countries of the region—but not from a position of strength. Since Russia has lost Europe as the main market for its resources, it needs alternative partners for trade and transit. Therefore, Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors have become increasingly important as major transit routes to other markets and to circumvent sanctions. Member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, like Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, play a particularly important role for Russia’s circumvention of sanctions.
As a result, new regional orders will emerge in the post-Soviet regions as other actors engage in competition and cooperation with Russia. The key trends in these regions are less stability and changing power constellations. Since no actor can dominate regional security like Russia did in the past, this will be a painful process, creating instability and insecurity. In its struggle against decline, Russia will become even more disruptive, with an interest in grey zones and managed instability, resulting in an increasing will to use force. Russia will have sufficient income through oil sales to influence its neighbors for some time, but how much room Moscow has to maneuver in its destructive policy depends on the political will and power of other actors.
Western Weakness, Russian Strength
A weakened Russia does not mean a weak Russia that is unable to act. Moscow’s willingness to use military force combined with hybrid instruments—disinformation, corruption, election interference, attacks on strategic infrastructure—help to maintain its escalation dominance in Ukraine and to impact decision-making in the West.7 Moscow has been successful in fueling divisions in Western countries, and plays on weaknesses and insecurities in Western societies. Moscow clearly has an advantage in this respect. Europe lacks strong leadership, is incapable of making fundamental decisions for its own security, and relies on US leadership to support Ukraine. President Putin is willing to pay a high price for a victory in Ukraine. When examining the different cost-benefit calculations made by Russian and Western leaders, it seems that Moscow has an advantage. This might change with Donald Trump, who, on one hand, will further undermine multilateralism and unity in the West, strengthening authoritarian rule globally, but, on the other hand, because of Trump’s transactional approach, he might be a bigger challenge to Putin than the risk-averse Joe Biden. The Trump administration has an interest in ending the war in Ukraine quickly and seems to be willing to make compromises with Moscow. At the same time, the new US government is no longer willing to give free security guarantees to Europe, which might undermine NATO’s ability to deter Russian aggression.
Countries like Russia and China are increasingly challenging the EU’s normative approach, operating without conditions on rule of law, good governance, labor rights, or environmental standards. Russia is a norm-setter for dictatorial governance, cutting off civil society from foreign funding through a foreign agent law and instituting laws to control media and to discredit minorities. For many authoritarian rulers, Russia is an attractive partner for authoritarian governance to obtain resources and instruments for staying in power.
The End of US Global Dominance
The erosion of multilateral institutions and the end of US global dominance in an increasingly transactional world are part of broader global trends. Donald Trump will further accelerate these tendencies and strengthen authoritarian coalition-building and transactional policy. Europe will be the main loser because of its slow political decision making, lack of military power, limited capabilities to act, and increasing economic decline. Because the war has direct impact on European security, it is a European challenge. Russia’s war in Ukraine is a major test for transatlantic unity and Europe’s ability to act with or without the US. Western actors, including the US and EU, are no longer decisive actors in many areas of global politics, and cannot force countries in Asia, South America, Africa, or the Middle East to follow their sanctions policy on Russia. Western actors are not willing to pay a higher price for consequent sanctions on Russia, and have an interest in keeping Russian oil and gas on the global market to prevent an increase in prices.
Russia has been active in the Global South with its communication and disruption policy, and has been successful in convincing many countries about its side of the story regarding the war on Ukraine. Western double standards, anti-Americanism, and European colonial legacies play into Moscow’s hands. With Israel’s war in Gaza, Western actors are losing even more international support, while Russia maintains relations with Iran and all Arab countries.
In addition to Iran and North Korea, China has become a major supporter of Russia in its war against Ukraine. Beijing has no interest in Russia losing the war, but prefers a weakened Russia that must make compromises in terms of market access. Both China and Russia share an interest in ending the US’s global hegemony, but have different strategies to reach this goal. While China wants to redefine and shape global norms in its interest, Russia, because of its relative economic weakness, acts as a disrupter; it subverts societies in other countries, threatens violence and nuclear war, and creates or maintains grey zones, undermining Western influence. While China seeks to change the rules of the game in the existing institutional framework, Russia seeks to disrupt the existing order when it cannot benefit from it. Russia’s cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea creates new opportunities for all sides and impacts the regional orders in the Middle East and Asia.
Transactional Institutionalism
The rise of alternative global and regional institutions is the result of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world. Russia’s war in Ukraine and its increasing alienation from the West are further accelerating this global fragmentation. BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but also ad hoc organizations like the Astana format between Iran, Russia, and Turkey in the context of the Syrian war are becoming more attractive for many countries because they offer alternative platforms for exchange without Western dominance and give direct access to authoritarian countries with similar interests. These organizations are an expression of interest-oriented, transactional international relations, and while they might be less institutionalized than multilateral institutions like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), or Western-dominated financial institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this is precisely what makes them attractive for authoritarian states interested in ad hoc coalitions.
In global politics, it is not about autocracies versus democracies. Most countries are hybrid regimes that do not want to belong to either camp but to benefit from relations with all sides. An expression for this reality is the lack of support for sanctions against Russia by many countries outside the West. Pragmatism and transactionalism are the main features of such a policy and many countries in the Global South understand Western values as based on double standards, arrogant, and hypocritical. Emerging platforms like BRICs, pushed by Western sanctions policy, encourage alternative financial instruments and currencies for trade. Countries like Russia and Iran, but also benefitters like China, are the drivers of such trends. These institutions help set up alternative financial instruments without substantial institutionalization. Fragmentation of the financial system, decentralization of the internet, and interest-oriented coalition-building are key trends of a new world order.
Europe’s Inability to Act
European countries have tried to stay within their comfort zone as the world goes through such dynamic changes, while Russia benefits from emerging trends that increase global divisions and award those willing and able to act quickly. European countries, and especially Germany, are not ready for such a world and are lacking a policy to shape or influence these trends. The German Zeitenwende, Germany’s supposed security transformation, was finally a recognition of the new reality, and a reaction to Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine.
In his Zeitenwende speech, former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recognized for the first time Putin’s Russia as the main threat to European and German security. Despite the war, European politics were falling back into old realities, and reacted to fundamental changes with the instruments and mindset of the past. The lack of preparation for Donald Trump’s second term as US president and the lack of sovereignty in its security policy makes Europe more vulnerable and creates opportunities for Putin to win the war—or, at least, not lose it. This will have major consequences for Europe’s credibility in its neighborhood and in the world with major impact on European and global security.
To conclude, it must be stated, that Putin is not winning the war in Ukraine because of his strength, but because of Western weakness and indecisiveness. Europe will be sidelined when Trump strikes a deal with Putin over Ukraine, but this will not stop the further decline of Russia, which lacks the resources and the ideas for its own future or to shape global politics. The main challenge to Russia will be the US under President Trump, rising powers like China and India, and smaller states in the post-Soviet region with whom Moscow will have to make compromises. Russia’s war in Ukraine is accelerating the decline of Russia as a regional and global power, but this process will take time and will be costly for its neighbors and for the world.
