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Divided in Diversity
Overcoming Europe's Incoherence in National Approaches to Civilian CSDP

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Despite 15 years of mission practice, EU member states are often reluctant to commit considerable resources to civilian CSDP. One reason for this is the fact that EU member states diverge considerably on the role and strategic relevance they attribute to civilian crisis management in general, and civilian CSDP specifically. This divergence hampers a common understanding on the future direction of civilian CSDP, which is direly needed to strengthen it through the Civilian CSDP Compact.

DGAP

Contents

Executive Summary

Almost two decades after the creation of the civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the nature of conflicts and security challenges for civilian missions has evolved. While the instrument has been used frequently, the member states of the European Union (EU) have until now failed to find a common approach to its future development. With the Civilian CSDP Compact agreed in November 2018[1], EU member states pledged to make the instrument fit for current and future security challenges. This effort would benefit greatly if member states could reach agreement on the future direction of civilian CSDP and civilian crisis management in general. Based on a comparison of national security strategies and background interviews with member state representatives[2], this study examines where member states stand concerning the relevance and purpose of civilian CSDP, and for which reasons they value the instrument. On this basis, the study can then provide an overview of EU member states' motivation to invest in civilian CSDP and the possible incentives that could trigger stronger engagement.

The analysis shows how EU member states differ in their assessment of the strategic relevance of civilian crisis management and civilian CSDP in particular [3]: 11 EU member states value civilian crisis management as strategically relevant in the analyzed strategies. 13 member states do not acknowledge the strategic relevance of civilian crisis management and focus only on military crisis management in their national security strategies. This inconsistency is one reason why member states have not been able to agree on the future direction of civilian crisis management as reflected by the standstill in civilian CSDP in recent years.

The analysis also reveals an inconsistency between national strategies and EU declarations such as the EU Global Strategy or the Civilian CSDP Compact[4]: At EU level, civilian crisis management is promoted and valued as part of the integrated approach, but not all national strategies reflect this attitude. Some member states still consider civilian CSDP a "nice to have" add-on instead of a must for putting an integrated approach into practice. A closer look at the national strategies and especially the interviews also shows that EU states emphasize different aspects of the added value of civilian CSDP, such as fostering partnerships and visibility, but also advancing their national political clout and expertise.

As a comprehensive actor in international security, the EU needs a stronger civilian CSDP. If member states want to strengthen civilian crisis management and civilian CSDP in the long-term, they need to become more coherent about their strategic goals. The Civilian Compact 2018 opened a window of opportunity for a wider debate on civilian CSDP and EU civilian crisis management in general.

To foster consensus on civilian crisis management, EU member states should make use of civilian CSDP's unique selling points to increase strategic autonomy. Through civilian CSDP, member states can pursue a foreign policy which focuses on sustainable security and stabilization. This is why member states should strengthen structures and legislation at their national level in order to bring the secondment system into line with the current needs of EU crisis management.

Finally, EU member states need to invest in strategic communication about civilian crisis management. National debates about new crisis management strategies should be used to include targeted communication about civilian crisis management. Member states should import targets and commitments from EU documents into their national strategies.

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1. In Search of Common Ground

The Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) suffers from a chronic problem: the reluctance of many member states to commit national resources to commonly agreed objectives and goals. Recent EU conclusions once again state that civilian CSDP "provides unique added value to the EU's global role in international peace and security".[5] But when it comes to implementation, a good number of member states shy away from concrete qualitative and quantitative commitments. The civilian CSDP Compact from November 2018 could mark a change in this pattern, but delivery on its 22 commitments is still pending.

Since the early days of civilian CSDP, EU member states have promised to make it an effective and capable instrument of EU crisis management. In the intergovernmental policy field of CSDP, they are the key actors. The member states hold political control and provide the majority of capabilities. All decisions on deployment, mandates, appointments of mission leaders, reviews, and extensions need to be agreed unanimously by member states. They are also called upon to second qualified personnel to missions.

Many efforts were made (e.g. through Headline goals 2008 and 2010[6]) to improve the implementation of commonly agreed targets, but due to the lack of political will in the member states, it still falls short. For example, civilian missions are often understaffed because, among other reasons, the share of seconded personnel has gone down since the first missions. Today's security challenges require specialized skills that are even harder to recruit. The result is that the size of civilian missions in the field today is much smaller in terms of personnel than at its peak in 2009-2010.

All of this raises the question if EU countries really are committed to civilian CSDP, or whether they have other priorities. Given the changing security environment, this question is becoming ever more pressing. The European Union is forced to react to large-scale crises in its neighborhood which call for a more professional approach in which member states join. This includes strong civilian crisis management, which in contrast to military interventions is more likely to foster sustainable security in the EU's neighborhood. To address external conflicts and crises, EU civilian crisis management – and civilian CSDP as one of its instruments – needs to be adapted to current challenges and needs.

However, this necessary increase in capabilities and responsiveness will only happen if member states can agree on its strategic relevance. Today, missions can often function rather well if member states attribute a high political relevance to them and thus allocate them adequate resources and staff. But in cases where some member states believe the situation less relevant, or if attention for the context of a crisis decreases, contributions will likely go to other institutions, e.g. Frontex.

Strategic relevance, in this case, stands for the importance member states attribute to civilian crisis management and civilian CSDP as a tool to achieve their own foreign policy priorities and security objectives. How member states approach this issue can be determined through their national security culture which is expressed inter alia through their national security strategies.[7] To assess common ground and important divergencies between EU member states, these documents are assessed along three dimensions:

1. The role and relevance they give to civilian crisis management in general
2. The importance civilian CSDP is accorded in this context
3. The added value member states expect from civilian CSDP

An analysis along these three dimensions provides a mosaic of national perspectives on civilian crisis management and civilian CSDP. It explains at least partly why it has been so difficult to match declared ambitions with decisive actions and contributions.

2. Relevance of Civilian Crisis Management in Member States' National Strategies

As an assessment of national strategies shows, EU member states diverge considerably on the role and strategic relevance of civilian crisis management. Not even a majority of member states refers to civilian crisis management as strategically important (Table 1). Few member states have separate civilian crisis management strategies. Still, most member states include references to civilian CSDP. They have the instrument on their radar even though they do not spell out what particular relevance they attach to it. So while these countries generally support civilian CSDP, other instruments are being prioritized, e.g. in terms of ambitions or resources. The divergence between member states on civilian CSDP is also reflected by the extent to which they explicitly commit to increasing their contributions. The following sections discuss these findings in more depth.

2.1. The Role and Relevance of Civilian Crisis Management

Out of 24 analyzed national security strategies, 11 acknowledge the strategic relevance of civilian crisis management in general – not just EU civilian crisis management (see Table 1). 13 EU member states do not acknowledge any strategic relevance of civilian crisis management and focus exclusively on military crisis management. For three countries – Cyprus, Greece and Portugal – no recent accessible security strategy in English was found. Great Britain was excluded from the analysis because of the upcoming Brexit.

Table 1: Breakdown of the relevance of civilian crisis management in national strategies[8]

Relevance of civilian crisis management acknowledged/ underlined	Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden (11)
Separate civilian crisis management strategy	Belgium, Finland, Germany (3)
General reference to civilian CSDP	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden (18)
Commitment to improving national contributions or structures for civilian missions	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden (13)

Sources: EU member states' national security strategies. An overview of the analyzed documents is provided in the annex.

The role that EU member states attribute to civilian crisis management in their national security strategies differs widely. Member states fall between two extremes: On the one end, EU states like France see civilian crisis management only as supplementary to military action.[9] On the other end, countries like Finland view it as an instrument to protect core security interests in a changing world.[10]

Further analysis of the national security strategies reveals a serious inconsistency: The vast majority of EU member states (21) highlights the integrated approach – which includes civilian crisis management – as a primary solution given the complexity of current conflicts in their national strategies. Yet the national strategies of 13 EU countries do not treat civilian crisis management as relevant, focusing strongly on military crisis management instead. If the integrated approach was seriously considered, civilian instruments would not be neglected but feature equally on the agenda. The integrated approach refers to the concerted use of all external action instruments available to achieve common objectives (e.g. civilian CSDP, military CSDP, humanitarian aid and development policy, but not exclusively EU instruments). So while the majority refers to an integrated approach, this is not always reflected in the substance of their strategies as civilian instruments are partly neglected.

All in all, 18 EU member states refer to civilian CSDP in their national strategies. By itself, such a reference does not indicate that countries have a common understanding of the scope civilian CSDP should have, or of the strategic priorities it should serve. Some of them do not go beyond short references. Clearly, they have not yet incorporated civilian CSDP's strategic potential for security into their strategies. Still, the references show that civilian CSDP – as a specific instrument of civilian crisis management – is on the radar of most EU member states. These countries recognize that the instrument is part of their security toolbox. Only six of the national strategies analyzed do not refer to civilian CSDP at all.

2.2. Few EU Member States Have National Civilian Crisis Management Strategies

Only Belgium, Finland and Germany have published a separate strategy dedicated to civilian crisis management. These strategies focus on civilian crisis management as part of an international effort to prevent crises or contain their impact. Slovenia is a special case as it has drawn up a strategy on its participation in international operations and missions, including those of the EU.

The publication of separate civilian crisis management strategies reflects the particular priority that EU member states give this topic. Drafting strategic documents

activates significant potential in a political system. The strategy process raises awareness in the relevant national ministries and among stakeholders. Drawing up a strategy also helps to bring together the existing knowledge on civilian crisis management in each EU member state. Moreover, countries increase the level of transparency for the specific role they envisage for civilian crisis management, the national objectives they wish to achieve through civilian instruments, and the use of resources.

2.3. Commitments to Improve National Contributions and Structures

Out of the 24 national strategies analyzed for this paper, 13 EU member states make commitments to increase their contribution or strengthen their national structures for civilian missions. For these EU member states, civilian CSDP appears to be worth more investment. At the same time, the commitments differ widely in their scope and level of detail: Some EU member states, such as Denmark, stress the importance of EUBAM Libya as a specific mission to which they want to contribute more staff.[11] Sweden, in contrast, aims at becoming "one of the world's leading contributors to civilian crisis management operations."[12] Others state more generally that they will pledge more personnel to civilian missions, or that they will aim to improve their national structures.

EU member state contributions in the form of qualified seconded personnel are crucial for the success of civilian missions. Secondments of personnel are voluntary, and EU member states take decisions in line with their national capacities and priorities. Therefore, a unanimous decision at EU level to launch a mission does not guarantee sufficient personnel. In civilian CSDP, quantitative targets for contributions are always controversial, the most recent example being the Civilian Compact of 2018, which ultimately set moderate quantitative targets. In the past, EU states failed to fulfill Civilian Headline Goals.[13] In comparison to the first missions in 2003, the percentage of seconded personnel in missions has steadily declined in comparison to the share of contracted international personnel.

3. Why EU Member States Value Civilian CSDP

While their assessments of the importance of civilian instruments differ, many EU member states see distinct added value in the instrument of civilian CSDP. The most important reasons cited in favor of civilian CSDP are to promote partnerships, complement other EU instruments and contribute to the EU integrated approach, and work on the nexus of internal and external security. Interviews with member state representatives and the analysis of national security strategies show that civilian CSDP has more dimensions than just the operations on the ground. Governments obviously see and use it for, inter alia, leveraging national interests through EU instruments and contributing to national foreign policies. A good example is France which in recent years has actively pushed for an extension of the EU civilian engagement in Africa, resulting in capacity building missions in Niger, Mali, and – possibly in the near future – the Central African Republic. These missions complement France's military engagement in the region. Another visible example is Italy's strong support for EUBAM Libya's efforts to strengthen the country's capacities in border management while Italy is bilaterally engaged in the training of the Libyan coast guard.

3.1. Foster Partnerships and Create More Visibility

The political potential and high visibility of civilian CSDP in partner countries constitute particularly important elements of added value for EU member states, according to the interviews with member state representatives. 15 years after the first civilian CSDP mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, EU member states are highly aware that the pooling of resources and the presence of the EU flag lend more political weight and potential to their actions than individual EU states can achieve on their own, especially in interactions with partners abroad.

Civilian CSDP has been most frequently used in crises where the EU wanted to demonstrate its presence, support, and interest to partner states. A good example for this is Ukraine since 2014. The country is a key partner in the EU's eastern neighborhood. As Russian expansionist policies affect the national security interests of most EU member states, the EU quickly agreed that it should provide some kind of presence in support of Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea. A Civilian Response Team (CRT) was rapidly deployed which then helped operational planning by liaising with the Ukrainian authorities. It preceded the deployment of the civilian mission EUAM Ukraine that now supports the reform of the civilian security sector.

The considerations leading to the mandate of EUAM Ukraine are a good example of the EU choosing a balanced approach to the country: The Ukrainian government had favored a more robust EU presence in Eastern Ukraine to contain Russian military aggression. EU member states, however, wanted to avoid an open conflict with Russia, while also demonstrating their continued po-

litical support for Ukraine as a close partner of the EU and its territorial integrity. Hence, the civilian CSDP mission EUAM Ukraine was designed to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian civilian security sector, focusing on the rule of law and the fight against corruption. The EU mission in Kiev was supplemented by the signing of an Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine as well as diplomatic initiatives of EU member states, e.g. through the Normandie format. So the mission is the most visible but not the only sign of EU engagement with Ukraine to counter Russian aggression.

3.2. Increase Leverage Through Political Backing

Acting within the EU framework gives a member state more political weight on the international stage than if countries go it alone. Political leverage resulting from the unique institutional setting of the EU is for many EU member states an important driver for investment in civilian CSDP. Few actors in international crisis management have enough political clout on their own to address issues that are highly sensitive with recipient states.

Member state representatives underlined that the political buy-in and consent of 28 EU countries to all missions before deployment creates a high level of political weight and leverage vis-à-vis host governments, conflict parties and local populations. This is an advantage of civilian CSDP in comparison to other EU civilian instruments such as the European Commission's funding programs[14]. Commission instruments and programs are often implemented by external partners and thus do not have the same political clout. Taking this perspective on civilian CSDP, its intergovernmental nature is of critical importance. One of the lessons learned from the pilot Article 28 stabilization action in Mali was that without a strong buy-in of EU states, EU operations risk being politically lightweight.

Depending on the theater a mission operates in, a single powerful EU member state participating in the mission and taking a central driving role can provide additional leverage for civilian CSDP missions. Examples for this are France for the civilian missions in Niger and Mali, and Italy concerning EUBAM Libya.

3.3. Promote an Integrated Approach

In the view of many EU member states, civilian CSDP is a key component of the EU's integrated approach to crises. The variety and interplay of all civilian and military instruments and policies are considered very important features of the Union's external engagement. The wide range of civilian and military capabilities, instruments and policies at the EU's disposal is one of its main comparative advantages as a crisis management actor. With its communitarized policy fields, the EU's range also includes policies and tools not traditionally part of security and external action, for instance trade and environmental policies.

EU member state representatives stressed that in contrast to other international organizations, the EU can use its toolbox of external instruments under comprehensive political strategies. Civilian missions can promote these strategies in the field. Drawing up comprehensive regional strategies for crisis areas has not been the rule so far, but first steps have been made with political frameworks such as the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel[15] and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa.

CSDP, given its civil-military character, is important to the EU's ambition to be a relevant and coherent security actor on the international stage. For member states, it is also an important feature as comprehensive strategies create possibilities for synergy between civilian and military action.

However, EU member states also pointed out how difficult it is to achieve full integration – be it in civil-military relations or between the different instruments of EU civilian crisis management. The theory is still very different from the practice. Competition between EU institutions and actors for resources and visibility often hamper the integrated action and lessen its positive effects. While it is true that the treaties would permit integrated civil-military operations, this option has not been used so far. Therefore member states underline that there is still much unused potential in the EU integrated approach.

3.4. Sharpen the International Profile and Promote National Interests

EU member states which pool their resources and speak with one voice have far more clout. This huge difference in influence continues to be a main driver for CSDP. In their national strategies, over half of the EU member states acknowledge that their engagement in civilian CSDP helps them shape their international profile and increase their clout, reputation, and influence in the context of international crises. Some national strategies set targets for boosting their contributions or raising their share of senior personnel in EU missions in order to further increase national influence on missions and use CSDP to push national political aims.

This explains why EU member states value the political control they exercise over CSDP so highly. EU member

states can exercise more influence on mission mandates and conduct than on the operations of other international organizations. Hence, they can ensure that missions do not run against their national interests. EU member states decide on the launch of new CSDP missions unanimously and have a high degree of influence over their conduct through the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This body gives strategic and political guidance. The PSC receives reports from the heads of mission and makes decisions on mandates and strategic reviews, through which it determines the further direction of missions.

3.5. Foster a Value-Based Foreign Policy

In recent years, the world has seen a shift in the conduct of international politics: The benefits resulting from multilateral actions, which had remained nearly uncontested for two decades, have come under question. Newly elected populist and nationalist governments, most prominently in the United States, have turned towards unilateral or isolationist politics which supposedly serve national interests better. Powerful countries like China, Russia, and the United States appear to rely more and more on unilateral decisions to attain national priorities in foreign policy.

In light of these developments, it has become a foreign policy goal for some EU member states to strengthen the norm-oriented approach to international politics, including through civilian missions. For these member states, the EU appears to be the best forum to promote such an approach. Other institutions like the United Nations have been weakened, as formerly strong supporters like the US now question multilateral institutions.

For a core group of supporters of civilian CSDP, among them Germany and the Nordic countries, this possibility of pursuing a norm-oriented approach to stabilization is an important reason to further strengthen the instrument. With their high visibility in partner countries, civilian CSDP missions can extend and represent EU policies and principles abroad. Some EU member states express an intention to conduct missions in the EU framework with a holistic understanding of stabilization. They greatly appreciate that the EU's civilian CSDP in concert with other EU instruments and funds can contribute to building sustainable security. This was mentioned in several interviews.

Several member states see this argument as especially important when comparing the EU to other international organizations that are active in crisis management. The EU and especially the CSDP are seen as frameworks to conduct a value-based foreign policy. The EU views itself as a community of free and democratic societies that is based on shared values. For some EU member states, this constitutes an important advantage in comparison to other frameworks whose participants differ on fundamental values and principles. Nevertheless, fragmentation tendencies and quarrels within the Union have undermined some parts of its value-based fundament.

3.6. Invest in the Nexus Between Internal and External Security

National security strategies and interviews with member state representatives show that national governments see the nexus between internal and external security as another reason to engage in civilian CSDP. EU member states have acknowledged that the EU, to ensure its internal security, also needs to defend its interests abroad. This is now part of all deployment decisions in civilian CSDP.

The relevance of the internal-external security nexus has become more apparent since the EU Global Strategy was published. In recent EU documents, member states underlined that civilian CSDP has to be able to address new security challenges including migration, border management, terrorism and organized crime. This defines internal security interests as a driving force for civilian CSDP missions. All EU member states acknowledge that the cooperation between CSDP and the Justice and Home Affairs institutions in the EU must improve. As an example, civilian CSDP complements the work Frontex does on the EU's external borders by addressing causes for migration in the partner countries.

3.7. Benefit From the Unique Features of Civilian CSDP

Many EU member states see civilian CSDP as unique because it provides partner countries with high-end expertise, e.g. in the area of policing, the judiciary, and through capacity building. This calls for qualifications that generally are not available on the recruitment market. While some EU institutions such as the Commission have to contract all personnel, EU member states can contribute specialized personnel through secondment. Civilian CSDP thus has an advantage in terms of expertise.

Furthermore, this expertise often opens unique channels of communication to national authorities. In terms of trust-building, it makes a considerable difference if for example police officers from the host country are taught by police officers from EU countries or by freelance personnel. Regardless of their country of origin, police officers to some extent share an understanding of the problems and

challenges which come with their profession. This understanding among specialists can make a difference in capacity building, especially when communication channels go "from uniform to uniform." Instructors respond better to the needs of their mentees when they have a sound sense of the deep-rooted challenges in their field of work in the host country. The daily engagement of highly qualified seconded specialists with national stakeholders creates a profitable level of interaction for both sides.

4. Overcoming Europe's Incoherence Over Civilian CSDP

The analysis has shown that EU member states so far lack a common strategic vision for civilian crisis management in general and for civilian CSDP in particular. Governments diverge on the strategic importance they attribute to civilian crisis management: 13 EU member states do not even mention civilian crisis management as strategically relevant. The disunity in the relevance accorded to civilian CSDP is also reflected by the differences in commitment in national strategies: Only 13 EU states have pledged to strengthen the structures and national contributions to civilian missions.

This incoherence hampers any ambition to strengthen EU civilian crisis management. Current discussions about what capabilities and capacities the EU will need in the coming years to manage crises in its neighborhood reflect this lack of common ground. One example is the question of a quantitative target for personnel on rapid deployment rosters which was raised during the Compact process. While some member states see these quantitative targets as crucial for civilian CSDP to fulfill its crisis management tasks, others are less ambitious and fear to enter into long-term obligations (Ultimately, moderate quantitative targets were included in the Compact; it remains to be seen how many member states will contribute to fulfilling them). Equally, only some member states are willing to supply civilian CSDP missions with a larger and more flexible budget. Both examples highlight the diverging levels of ambition. As long as EU member states do not agree on the role and importance of civilian crisis management, there will be no strong engagement to provide resources and support for civilian missions. The EU will only make important progress in adapting the EU's civilian crisis response to new security challenges if it achieves more than the smallest common denominator. It needs to use its various instruments for crisis management and peacebuilding in a concerted way, with clear competences, boundaries, and better cooperation.

More coherence is needed to make full use of civilian CSDP. EU states need to agree a common view of the problems that civilian CSDP should address. The implementation of the Civilian Compact of November 2018 offers an opportunity to realign policies, as EU member states will need to match their priorities for civilian CSDP in order to increase capabilities effectively through the Compact over the coming years.

Draft an EU Conflict Management Strategy: The analysis has shown that EU member states do not have a common strategic vision for civilian crisis management. In the short term, member states should strengthen civilian CSDP by implementing their commitments from the Compact. For longer-term progress, EU member states should draw up an EU conflict management strategy. This strategy should spell out the much-needed division of labor between the EU's crisis management instruments and show ways towards better cooperation with other instruments. Moreover, a conflict management strategy should define clear goals and purposes for all instruments, especially of those in civilian crisis management and set targets for providing the necessary resources. Such a strategy process needs to be begin with a comprehensive audit of EU crisis management and show what has worked so far. Drafting a strategy would create an opportunity to engage not only the foreign ministries, but all relevant national stakeholders – especially ministries of the interior and ministries of defense – in the drafting process. This process would raise awareness of the need for civilian crisis management at the EU states' level, bring together existing knowledge, increase transparency, and foster strategic coherence in EU civilian crisis management.

Make use of civilian CSDP's unique selling points to foster strategic autonomy: The EU should extend its definition of strategic autonomy to include civilian means of crisis management.

The debate about a common understanding of what EU strategic autonomy means will continue over the coming months. When discussing whether the EU needs the capability to defend itself and independently pursue its policies abroad, most experts agree that the EU should work towards more autonomous capabilities without decoupling completely from the NATO collective defense system[16]. This debate should not overlook the fact that many EU states see their own security tied not only to better defense capabilities, but also to a comprehensive approach including civilian instruments like peacebuilding and diplomacy. So far, the debate has focused exclusively

on military aspects, though many of the current security challenges cannot be solved by military means alone. In its definition of strategic autonomy, the EU should aim to create the means of acting autonomously in matters of stabilization of other states – therefore involving military as well as civilian means.

Strengthen civilian CSDP at the national level: The Union will need a robust civilian crisis management to manage future complex crises. EU member states recognize that civilian CSDP can contribute to this by providing specialized skills through secondments. To make civilian CSDP more capable and responsive, the secondment system must be brought in line with the current needs of EU crisis management. Therefore, EU member states should commit to strengthening national structures and legislation. National implementation plans as agreed in the Compact November 2018 should be publicly accessible, or at least be shared among EU states to foster coordination and cooperation.

Advance strategic communication: Member states and EU institutions should strengthen their strategic communication about the relevance of civilian crisis management. EU states should publicize the added value of civilian CSDP in national debates. Moreover, member states should include targets and commitments from EU documents in their national strategies to foster awareness and debate among relevant national stakeholders. Ministries of foreign affairs should also regularly publish the number of personnel seconded to civilian missions.

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Annex

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2 Background interviews were conducted with officials from member states based on cross-selection and availability. Their views may not fully represent member states' views.

3 The two terms "civilian crisis management" and "civilian CSDP" are not treated as interchangeable in the study. Civilian CSDP is regarded as a specific instrument of civilian crisis management.

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8 For this paper, the national security strategies, or, where not available, the defense strategies of EU member states were analyzed. When available, civilian crisis management strategies were also analyzed. For Cyprus, Greece and Portugal, no recent accessible security strategy in English was found. Great Britain was excluded because of the upcoming Brexit. Strategies published up until October 2018 were taken into account.

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